












Abstract!As* it* is* commonly* assumed* that* the* European* Commission* acts* as* a* unitary*actor,*we*know*little*about*how*Commissioners’*national*and*partisan*ties*affect*the*deliberations*among*member*states*in*the*Council.*This*article*addresses*this*gap* by* linking* the* voting* decisions* governments* take* in* the* Council* back* to*individual*characteristics*of*the*proposing*Commissioner.*Analysing*9025*voting*decisions*on*497*legislative*proposals*taken*between*1998*and*2006,*it*is*found*that* shared* national* and* partisan* ties* ease* interCinstitutional* decisionCmaking*with* nationality* taking* precedence* over* partisanship.* Overall,* Commissioners*appear*to*take*the*preferences*of*their*home*country*and*to*a*lesser*extent*also*their* political* party* into* consideration* when* drafting* legislative* proposals,*thereby*decreasing*the*likelihood*of*contestations.*
! !
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Introduction!European* Commissioners* are* formally* required* to* carry* out* their*responsibilities* independently* of*member* states’* influence* and* to*promote* the*general*interest*of*the*European*Union*in*doing*so*(Article*17,*TFEU).*Yet*most*Commissioners*are*party*politicians*with*previous*political*careers*in*their*home*countries*(see*Döring,*2007;*Wonka,*2007).*As*the*European*Union’s*legislative*agendaCsetter,* the* Commission* initiates* the* legislative* process* by* presenting* a*proposal.* Each* member* state* then* votes* on* this* proposal* in* the* Council.*Depending*on*the*relevant*procedure,*the*European*Parliament*(EP)*is*involved*as* an* additional* veto* player.* As* it* is* commonly* assumed* that* the* Commission*acts*as*a*unitary*actor,*we*know* little*about*how*Commissioners’*national*and*partisan*ties*affect*the*deliberations*among*member*states*in*the*Council.**Anecdotal*evidence*suggests*that*Commissioners*do*not*always*act*independent.*In*early*2008,* the*Commission*proposed*to*decrease*new*cars’*greenhouse*gas*emissions.* Shortly* afterwards,* the* German* Commissioner* for* Enterprise* and*Industry,*Günter*Verheugen,*argued*against*such*targets*–*presumably*to*protect*Germany’s* important* car* industry* (Goldirova,* 2008;* Willis,* 2010).* Regarding*partisan*influence,*it*is*noteworthy*that*with*its*focus*on*the*Lisbon*Strategy*and*sustainability* the* Commission’s* work* programme* for* 2005* addresses* some*central*issues*of*the*Socialist*2004*EPCelection*campaign*(cf.*Commission,*2005;*PES,* 2004).* However,* there* are* also* examples* of* Commissioners* resisting*national* and* partisan* influence.* For* instance,* the* Dutch* Commissioner* Neelie*Kroes*is*known*for*not*taking*orders*from*‘back*home’*(Willis,*2010).**Although*it*is*the*‘starting*point’*in*most*decisionCmaking*studies,*little*attention*has*been*paid*to*possible*motivations*for*Commissioners’*behaviour.*Also,*when*studying* the* role* of* national* parties* in* providing* linkages* across* European*institutions,*the*focus*has*mostly*been*on*voting*unity*between*the*Council*and*the* EP* (Hagemann* and*Høyland,* 2010;*Mühlböck,* 2013).* The* assumption* that*the* Commission* is* a* unitary* actor* is* not* employed* in* this* article.* Instead,* the*Commission* is* conceptualised* as* a* collective* actor,* thereby* allowing* a* closer*look* at* individual* Commissioners* and* accordingly* the* central* role* of* party*
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politicians*in*the*Commission.*This*is*empirically*demanding*as*the*Commission*always* seeks* to* ‘speak*with* one* voice’.* Therefore,* to* identify* such* individualClevel*effects,*member*states’*reactions*in*the*Council*to*a*proposal*from*a*given*Commission*are*analysed.*This*analysis*focuses*on*the*relation*between*Council*and*Commission,*largely*ignoring*the*EP*for*now.**To* understand* the* added* value* of* considering* the* proposing* Commissioner* in*the* study* of* member* states’* voting* behaviour* in* the* Council,* the* next* section*reviews*the*Council*voting*literature.*Then,*the*principalCagent*relation*between*the*two*institutions*is*discussed,*before*hypotheses*on*the*impact*of* individual*Commissioners’* characteristics* on* Council* voting* are* formulated.* These*hypotheses*are*then*tested*on*a*dataset*containing*information*on*487*contested*votes* held* between* 1998* and* 2006.* Finally,* conclusions* on* the* impact* of*Commissioner*characteristics*on*the*EU’s*legislative*process*are*drawn.**
!
Council!Voting!on!Commission!Proposals!DecisionCmaking*in*the*Council*has*long*been*a*‘black*box’*(e.g.*Veen,*2011)*as*no*voting* records*were* publicised* before* 1993.* Since* then,* the* Council’s*minutes*contain*voting*records*of*adopted*legislation.*The*academic*literature*on*Council*voting* has* identified* factors* influencing* member* states’* voteCchoice* and* also*coalition* building* between*member* states.* At* the*member* state* level,* country*size*(Hosli,*2008;*Mattila*and*Lane,*2001),*governmental*and*public*support*for*European*integration*(Hosli,*2008;*Mattila*and*Lane,*2001),*holding*the*Council*presidency* (Hosli* et* al.,* 2011;* Mattila,* 2004),* and* being* a* new*member* state*(Hosli* et* al.,* 2011)*were* found* to* influence* vote* choice.*While* larger*member*states* are* more* likely* to* oppose* the* Council* majority,* all* other* variables*decrease*the*likelihood*of*contestation.**Concerning* withinCCouncil* coalition* building,* Hix* (2005:* 87)* argues* that*coalitions*are*most*likely*to*form*between*governments*with*similar*policy*goals*and*interests,*a*claim*supported*by*findings*of*Elgström*et*al.*(2001).*Explicitly*addressing* the*role*parties*play* in* the*Council,*Hagemann*and*Høyland*(2008)*find* that* governments* are* most* likely* to* vote* with* ideologically* close*
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governments.* Accordingly,* the* authors* conclude* that* the* leftCright* dimension*figures* prominently* for* CouncilCinternal* coalition* building.* However,* van*Roozendaal*et*al.*(2011)*find*that*most*winning*coalitions*are*surplus*majorities*and*not*necessarily*ideologically*connected*on*the*leftCright*policy*scale.*Overall,*Council* coalitions* appear* to* be* leftCofCcentre* coalitions* as* Mattila* (2004:* 41)*finds* leftist* governments* less* frequently* in* the* minority* than* rightCwing*governments.* Additionally,* Hosli* (2008)* finds* that* as* a* government’s* distance*from* the*median* leftCright*position* increases,* so*does* its* likelihood*of*being* in*the*opposition.**Alternative* explanations* for* withinCCouncil* coalition* building* have* also* been*discussed.*Elgström*et* al.* (2001)*as*well* as*Mattila* and*Lane* (2001)* identify* a*durable* northCsouth* coalition* pattern* that* they* presume* is* a* manifestation* of*cultural* similarity,* whereas* Kaeding* and* Selck* (2005)* argue* for* a* netCcontributor* versus* netCreceiver* pattern.* According* to* Bailer* et* al.* (2010:* 5),*geography* does* not* offer* explanations,* but* it* is* objective* interests* that* are*reflected*in*Council*votes.*They*argue*that*structural*cleavages*dividing*rich*and*poor*member*states*shape*Council*voting*(Bailer*et*al.,*2010:*15).*Also*van*Aken*(2013)* has* recently* demonstrated* that* the* northCsouth* dimension* is* not*universally*applicable*across*policy*fields.*With*regard*to*interCinstitutional*coalition*building,*some*scholars*consider*the*role*of*political*parties*in*linking*CouncilC*and*EPCvoting.*Hagemann*and*Høyland*(2010)*show*that*also* in* this*bicameral*context*disagreement* in* the*Council* to*some*extent*follows*the*leftCright*dimension.*Mühlböck*(2013)*finds*that*voting*cohesion*across*institutions*is*mostly*due*to*an*overarching*consensus*and*that*the* European* Party* Group* has* more* influence* on* the* voting* behaviour* of* a*Member*of*the*EP*than*has*the*voting*behaviour*of*that*member’s*minister*in*the*Council.**The*discussed*studies*recognise*that*the*EU’s*institutions*are*composed*of*party*politicians* and* that* parties*may*provide* linkages* across* institutions.*However,*the* Commission* has* been* disregarded* in* this* respect,* even* though* it* is* also*mainly* composed* of* career* party* politicians.* This* article* makes* a* first* step*
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towards*filling*this*gap*by*linking*voting*in*the*Council*back*to*characteristics*of*the* proposing* Commissioner.* To* better* understand* the* CouncilCCommission*relation,*the*next*section*makes*use*of*the*principalCagent*framework.***
The!PrincipalMAgent!Relation!between!Council!and!Commission!Being* interested* in* the* relation* between* Commission* and* Council* in* the* EU’s*legislative*process,* a* closer* look* at* the* institutions’* formal* relations* is* needed.*Each* member* state* nominates* its* Commissioner,* who* needs* the* support* of* a*qualified*majority*of*the*member*states*in*the*Council*and*a*simple*majority*in*the* EP.* The* appointment* process* thus* represents* the* initial* delegation* of*authority* from* the*member* states* as* principals* to* the* Commissioners* as* their*agents* (see* for* instance* Pollack,* 1997;* Tallberg,* 2002).* Formally,* the*Commission*as*a*body*is*thus*the*agent*of*the*Council.*All*delegation*entails*problems*of*adverse*selection*and*moral*hazard.*Adverse*selection* refers* to* the*problem*of* selecting* a* ‘good’* agent,*while*moral* hazard*refers* to* problems* arising* from* asymmetric* information* and* the* resulting*impossibility* to* perfectly*monitor* the* agent* (Hölmstrom,* 1979).* Governments*try* to* alleviate* both* problems* in* CommissionerCnomination* through* preCappointment* screening,* as* described* by* Döring* (2007)* and* Wonka* (2007).*Governments* apparently* take* cues* from* past* behaviour* and* nominate* highCprofile*national*politicians*who*are*members*of*a*governing*party*–*increasingly*so* as* the* Commission’s* role* as* legislative* agendaCsetter* was* strengthened*throughout*the*various*Treaty*reforms*(see*Crombez*and*Hix,*2011).*The*principalCagent*literature*generally*expects*that*the*nomination*stage*of*an*agency*is*the*most*efficient*ex*ante*control*stage*principals*have*at*their*disposal*(e.g.* Calvert* et* al.,* 1989;* Epstein* and* O’Halloran,* 1994;* as* summarised* by*Reenock* and* Poggione,* 2004).* By* using* their* possibility* of* preCappointment*screening* and* nominating* candidates*with* a* public* track* record,* the* Council’s*behaviour* conforms*with* this* expectation.* In* scholarly* accounts* of* EU* policyCmaking,*the*Commission*was*long*treated*as*a*technocratic*–*or*even*apolitical*–*actor*(e.g.*Majone,*2001;*Moravcsik,*2002:*613).*Accordingly,*intergovernmental*
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bargains* were* deemed* decisive* for* European* integration* and* Commissioners*were*relegated*to*the*role*of*faithful*implementers*of*governmental*decisions.*If*this* perception* of* the* Commission* as* technocratic*was* valid,* no*moral* hazard*would* arise* and* Commissioners* would* faithfully* implement* member* states’*preferences.**In* contrast,* I* argue* here* that* the* principalCagent* relationship* persists* after*appointment,* leaving*the*possibility*of*moral*hazard.*The*central*assumption*is*that* if*political* factors*are* important*during*nomination,* these* factors*will*also*play*a*role*in*how*Commissioners*fulfil* their*tasks*once*in*office.*This* is* in* line*with*Wonka’s* statement* that*Commissioners* should*be*understood*as*political*rather* than* technocratic* actors* –* at* least* since* the* adoption* of* the* Single*European*Act*in*1987*(Wonka,*2007:*185).**Still,*Commissioners*are*depending*on*the*other*European*institutions.*While*the*Commission*is*the*legislative*agendaCsetter,*the*Council*and*the*EP*are*essential*for*policies*to*be*adopted.*The*standard*model*of*legislative*politics*suggests*that*the*Commission*acts*strategically*and*is*therefore*sensitive*to*the*preferences*of*the*other*European*institutions*(Crombez,*1997;*Tsebelis*and*Garrett,*2000).*By*anticipating* these* preferences,* legislative* proposals* are* formulated* such* that*they* have* a* good* chance* of* adoption* (Leuffen* and* Hertz,* 2010;* Steunenberg,*1994).* In* the* following* section,*hypotheses* as* to*how* the* ties* a*Commissioner*has* with* a* given* member* states* are* expected* to* influence* that* state’s* voting*behaviour*are*formulated.***
The!Influence!of!Commissioner!Characteristics!in!the!Legislative!Process!Each* Commissioner* is* the* political* head* of* a* DirectorateCGeneral* (DG),* the*administrative*units*into*which*the*Commission*is*subdivided.*In*the*legislative*process,*one*DG*is*primarily*responsible*for*each*proposal*and*its*Commissioner*is*politically*responsible*for*that*proposal.*It*is*assumed*that*Commissioners*do*not* have* the* capacities* to* closely* monitor* the* actions* of* their* colleagues* (cf.*Laver*and*Shepsle,*1996,*1999;*Martin*and*Vanberg,*2005).*Due* to* this* lack*of*
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oversight,* the* responsible* Commissioner* has* CommissionCinternal* agendaCsetting*power*–*he*or* she* thus*enjoys* ‘ministerial*discretion’*within*his*or*her*portfolio* (cf.* Hörl* et* al.,* 2005;* Wonka,* 2008:* 68).* I* argue* that* the* primarily*responsible* Commissioner* strategically* uses* this* power* to* influence* the*formulation*of*legislative*proposals,*given*the*preferences*of*the*other*actors.*If*the* Commissioner* indeed* uses* the* remaining* leeway* to* promote* his* or* her*preferences,*we*should*expect*member*states*sharing*these*preferences*to*vote*in*favour*of*that*Commissioner’s*proposals.*In*this*article,*two*potential*reasons*for* shared* preferences* between* a* Commissioner* and* a* member* state* are*discussed:*shared*nationality*and*shared*partisanship.**Each* member* state* nominates* its* Commissioner.* Still* –* as* discussed* above* –Commissioners*are*agents*of*all*member*states.*However,*it*is*the*member*states*that* are* responsible* for* choosing* their* nominees* without* the* interference* of*other*actors.*Even*if*a*nominee*is*rejected*during*the*process,*no*other*actor*is*in*a*position*to*propose*an*alternative*candidate.*It*is*reasonable*to*assume*that*the*ties*between*a*Commissioner*and*his*or*her*home*country*are*stronger*than*the*ties*with*the*other*member*states.*This*would*suggest*that*a*legislative*proposal*from*a*Commissioner*is,*on*average,*more*sensitive*to*the*interests*of*his*or*her*home* country* than* to* those* of* any* other* country.* Accordingly,*member* states*are*expected*hardly*contest*proposals*coming*from*their*‘own’*Commissioner.**
Hypothesis* 1* (National* Perspective):* A* member* state* is* less* likely* to* contest* a*legislative* proposal* if* the* proposing* Commissioner* comes* from*that*member*state.**Furthermore,* shared*partisan* ties* are* expected* to* ease* cooperation*during* the*Commission’s* term* in* office.* It* is* generally* expected* that* persons* sharing*partisan*affiliations*also*have*similar*preferences.*This*could*be*due*to*either*of*two* processes.* First,* a* set* of* preferences* could* induce* individuals* to* join* a*specific* party* which* is* accordingly* composed* of* likeCminded* people.* Second,*
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regardless* of* why* a* person* joined* a* party,* parties* are* deemed* to* be* most*effective* when* acting* cohesively.* Electorally,* this* makes* for* a* recognizable*‘brand* name’* (e.g.* Cox* and* McCubbins,* 1993);* and* in* the* legislative* process,*parties* reduce* the* transaction* costs* involved* in*policyCmaking* (Aldrich,* 1995).*While*the*party*label*is*certainly*valuable*in*the*national*context,*its*value*at*the*European*level*is*more*diffuse*(as*discussed*by*Lindberg*et*al.,*2008).*Still,*being*a*member*of*the*same*‘party*family’*as*the*nominating*government*is*a*big*asset*for*Commissioner*nominees*as* it*signals*shared*preferences*and*thus*promises*ready*cooperation.*After*appointment,* there* is*also*a*set*of* ‘sticks’*available*at* the*European* level*that* the* party* leadership* can* use* to* discipline* their* Commissioners.* In* this*regard,*career*prospects*are*assumed*to*play*an*especially*significant*role.* It* is*the* government* that* decides* on* reCnomination* and* can* also* influence* the*Commissioner’s* chances* of* reCentering* national* politics,* which* has* become*increasingly* important* over* time* as* a* CommissionerCpost* is* no* longer*necessarily*a*final*career*step*(see*Vaubel*et*al.,*2012).**
Hypothesis* 2* (Partisan* Perspective):* A* member* state* is* less* likely* to* contest* a*legislative* proposal* if* it* shares* partisan* ties* with* the* proposing*Commissioner.***The* theoretical* expectations* concerning* voting* behaviour* differ* between*Commissions.* It* is* assumed* that* the* withdrawal* of* the* Santer* Commission* in*1999*was*a*watershed*for*the*subsequent*Commissions.*The*Santer*Commission*needed* to* resign* due* to* allegations* of* fraud,* nepotism* and* mismanagement.*Through* its* resignation,* it* prevented* a* vote* of* no* confidence* in* the* EP.* It* has*been*argued*that*this*was*a*demonstration*of*power*by*the*EP*which*tightened*the*Commission’s*leash*(Ringe,*2005).**
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After* the* resignation* of* the* Santer* Commission,* the*member* states* used* their*power* to* adapt* the* agency* design.* First,* since* 1999* new* Commissioners* are*obliged*to*inform*the*EP*about*their*policy*goals*and*the*scrutinizing*process*in*the*EP*is*reported*to*have*become*more*intense*than*before*(Kassim*and*Menon,*2004:*90).*As*a*result,*the*principals*gain*additional*information*concerning*their*prospective* agents.* Second,* as* of* 2004* the* Nice* Treaty* changed* the*Commission’s* composition* to* one* Commissioner* per* member* state* and*Commissions* can* now* be* appointed* by* (QMV)* majority* voting* instead* of*unanimity.* Even* through* no* formal* vote* was* taken,* Crombez* and* Hix* (2011:*309)* argue* that* the* ‘shadow*of* a* vote’* enables* a* consensual* appointment* of* a*Commission* with* ideal* policies* preferred* by* a* qualified* majority* of* the* thenCincumbent*governments.*In*combination,*these*factors*resulted*in*a*Commission*that*was*less*centric*than*its*predecessors.**Overall,* Wonka* (2007)* shows* that* the* proportion* of* Commissioners* being* a*member* of* one* of* the* governing* parties* markedly* increased* after* the* Santer*Commission* and* that* also* (albeit* to* a* lesser* extent)* more* politically* visible*persons* were* appointed.* It* thus* seems* clear* that* the* nomination* process* has*been* tightened*after* the*negative*experience*governments*had*with* the*Santer*Commission.* Consequently,* it* can* be* expected* that* the* extra* care* given* to*selecting* good* agents* in* the* nomination* process* pays* dividends* during* the*legislative* process.* If* so,* the* effect* of* partisan* ties* in* reducing* contestation*should*have*been*stronger*for*the*Prodi*and*Barroso*Commissions.***
Hypothesis*3*(post8Santer):*The*effect*of*partisan*ties*in*decreasing*the*likelihood*of*contestation*is*stronger*for*the*postCSanter*era.***To* summarize,* so* far* I* have* argued* here* that* the* primarily* responsible*Commissioner*influences*the*formulation*of*legislative*proposals.*This*discretion*is,* however,* limited* by* the* preferences* of* the* other* actors* involved* in* the*legislative* process* –* with* this* article* focusing* on* the* Council.* By* anticipating*
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these* preferences,* Commissioners* seek* to* formulate* realistically* ‘adoptable’*proposals.*It*is*assumed*that*shared*nationality*and*partisanship*indicate*shared*preferences.*Member*states*sharing*such*ties*with*the*proposing*Commissioner*are*thus*expected*to*have*a* lower* likelihood*of*casting*a*contesting*vote* in*the*Council*than*member*states*not*sharing*such*ties.*Additionally,*it*is*expected*that*the*effect*of*partisan*ties*is*stronger*in*the*postCSanter*era.***
Data:!Council!Voting!from!1998!to!2006!The*analysis*focuses*on*how*characteristics*of*the*proposing*Commissioner*are*related* to* voting* behaviour* in* the* Council* of*Ministers.* The* unit* of* analysis* is*thus* the* countryCvote* per* proposal.* To* obtain* information* on* voting* in* the*Council,* I*use*different*datasets*(HayesCRenshaw*et*al.,*2006;*Hosli*et*al.,*2011;*Mattila*and*Lane,*2001)*to*cover*the*longest*time*period*possible.*By* using* PreLex,* the* EU’s* database* tracing* the* process* of* interCinstitutional*decisionCmaking,*the*Council*voting*records*were*linked*back*to*the*‘responsible’*Commissioner.*The*dataset*contains*information*on*497*contested*votes,*in*157*of* which* the* new* member* states* participated.* It* thus* comprises* voting*information*on*about*30*per*cent*of*the*1652*legislative*acts*the*Council*adopted*between* 1998* and* 2006* (according* to* Hagemann* and* ClerckCSachsse,* 2007;*Heisenberg,*2005).*My*data* is*constrained* in*several*ways.*First,* the*Council*only*publishes*voting*information*for*proposals*receiving*sufficient*support,*therefore*abstentions*and*‘no’*votes*under*QMV*are*the*only*observable*forms*of*contestation.*This*makes*the*overestimation*of*CouncilCinternal*consensus*highly*likely*(see*Mattila,*2004:*31).* Second,* the* dataset* of* HayesCRenshaw* et* al.* (2006)* is* constrained* to*contested* voting.* Accordingly,* I*will* also* only* focus* on* contested* voting* in*my*analysis,* i.e.* unanimous* decisions* with* abstentions* or* votes* under* QMV* with*insufficient* opposition.* In* doing* so,* I* only* analyse* votes* taken* on* legislative*proposals.* By* excluding* unanimous* decisions* from* the* analysis,* dissent* is*overestimated.*As*this*article*aims*to*analyse*the*effect*of*characteristics*of*the*
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proposing* Commissioner* on* a* member* state’s* likelihood* of* contestation,*focusing* on* contested* votes* ensures* that* the* more* informative* cases* are*included* in* the* analysis.* If* there* are* indeed*national* and*partisan*dynamics* at*play,*these*should*be*visible*in*the*cases*included*in*this*dataset.**The*dependent*variable*is*the*choice*a*member*state*makes*on*a*given*proposal.*Member* states* can* choose* to* vote* in* favour*or* against* a*proposal,* or* they* can*abstain.*Since*the*dataset*only*successful*proposals,* the*three*voting*categories*are*collapsed*into*the*dichotomous*variable*‘contestation’.*This*variable*captures*whether*the*voting*member*state*contested*the*proposal*by*voting*against*it*or*by*abstaining*(1)*or*voted*for*it*(0).**Figure*1*presents*the*frequency*of*contestation*as*a*percentage*of*all*votes*cast*per*member*state.*On*average,*each*of*the*included*proposals*was*contested*by*two*member* states* and* overall* 12* per* cent* of* the* votes* cast* were* contesting*votes* –* as* denoted* by* the* dashed* line.* There* is* considerable* variance* across*member* states,* 20%* of* the* German* votes* and* 5%* of* the* Cypriot* votes* being*contesting.**Associating*Commissioners*with*their*proposals*allows*coding*the*independent*variables* of* central* interest.* ‘Country* Match’* is* a* dichotomous* variables*capturing* whether* the* responsible* Commissioners* comes* from* the* voting*country*(1)*or*not*(0).*To*analyse*the*influence*of*partisanship,*two*dichotomous*variables* are* constructed* based* on* two* conceptualizations* of* governmentCinternal* preference* aggregation.* The* variables* capture* whether* or* not* the*national*party*of*the*Commissioner*is*a*member*of*the*same*EPCparty*groups*as*(a)* at* least* one* of* the* parties* in* government* in* the* voting* country* or* (b)* the*party*of*the*responsible*minister1.*The* first* conceptualization*perceives* the* government* as* collegial* actor.*Hence,*governments* are* assumed* to* decide* by*majority* vote* on* a* policy* that* is* then*********************************************************1*There*is*a*potential*problem*of*observational*equivalence*between*country*and*party*match*as*it*is*hard*to*determine*a*‘national’*interest*without*reference*to*the*nation’s*government.*However,*as*in*most*member*states*there*were*changes*in*government*in*the*analysed*period,*national*interests*remained*while*partisan*interests*changed.**
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upheld*by*their*ministers*(cf.*Andeweg,*1993).*In*the*context*of*the*Council,*this*conceptualization*presupposes*that*on*each*topic*all*national*governments*have*internally*decided*on*a*common*position*that*the*voting*minister*then*upholds*in*the*Council.*The*Council*voting*studies*discussed*above*have*defined*member*states’*ideal*points*with*reference*to*the*parties*in*government.*In*doing*so,*most*of*the*studies*weighted*the*position*by*the*number*of*cabinet*seats*held*by*each*of* the* parties* to* obtain* the* aggregated* government* position.* This*makes* for* a*tendency*towards*the*middle,*which*possibly*decreases*the*visibility*of*partisan*ties*in*Council*coalition*formation.**That* is*why* (in* addition* to* the* collegial* conceptualization)* I* also*use* a* second*conceptualization* that* focuses* on* the* responsible* national* minister.* When*applying* the*concept*of* ‘ministerial*discretion’*not*only* to* the*Commission*but*also*to*national*governments,* it* is*plausible*that*the*responsible*minister*has*a*greater* influence* on* the* policies* in* his* or* her* portfolio* (cf.* Laver* and* Shepsle,*1996,*1999;*Martin*and*Vanberg,*2005*as*discussed*above).**Generally,* this*definition*of*partisan* ties* is*broader* than* that* in*most*previous*articles,*where* the* focus*was* on* the* linkage* provided* by* national* parties* (see*Hagemann*and*Høyland,*2010;*Mühlböck,*2013).*While*each*Commissioner*selfCevidently*can*share*national* ties*with*only*one*member*state,*partisan*ties*can*be*shared*with*the*governments*of*several*member*states*–*and*it*might*even*be*the*case*that*the*government*of*the*Commissioner’s*home*country*is*not*one*of*them.**In* addition,* the* analysis* includes* some* control* variables.* At* the* countryClevel*these* are* ‘Presidency’,* ‘New* Member* State’* and* ‘Ratio* of* Annual* EU*Contribution/Recipience’.*Previous*analyses*of*Council*voting*have*consistently*found* that* holding* the* Council* Presidency* at* the* time* of* voting* significantly*reduces*a*country’s*likelihood*of*voting*against*the*proposal*(e.g.*Mattila,*2004).*‘New*Member* State’* controls* for*whether* or* not* the* country* joined* the* EU* in*2004,*as*Hosli*et*al.*(2011*as*discussed*above)*find*new*member*states*are*less*likely*to*contest*proposals*than*old*member*states.*Lastly,*by*including*‘Ratio*of*
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Council!voting!1998M2006!Table*2*provides* an*overview*of* the* effects* to*be* expected*by* crossCtabulating*contestation*with*the*key*independent*variables,*that*is*‘country*match’*and*one*of* the* party*match* variables,* respectively.* Of* the* 9025* voting* decisions,* 1127*(that*is*12.5*per*cent)*are*either*abstentions*or*no*votes.*Even*if*only*looking*at*contested*voting,*the*consensus*among*member*states*is*still*overwhelming.**When* crossCtabulating* contestation*with* the* country*match* variable,* one* sees*that* proposals* of* a* member* state’s* ‘own’* Commissioner* are* contested* less*frequently*than*proposals*made*by*Commissioners*from*other*member*states.*If*the* proposing* Commissioner* comes* from* the* voting* country,* the* frequency* of*contestation* drops* from*12.7%* to* 9.7%,* suggesting* that* the* proposal* is* in* the*interest*of*the*Commissioner’s*home*country.*This*is*in*line*with*the*expectation*that* shared* nationality* decreases* contestation,* as* formulated* in* the* first*hypothesis.**In*the*next*step,*the*dichotomous*partisan*variables*are*added.*First,*the*effect*of*the* variable* using* the* broader* operationalization* –* of* whether* the* proposing*Commissioner* comes* from* the* same* party* family* as* any* one* of* the* parties*represented*in*government*–*is*considered*in*Table*2a.*When*looking*only*at*the*effect*of*the*partisan*variable,*the*contestation*rate*hardly*differs*whether*or*not*the* party* matches.* When* also* taking* the* country* match* variable* into*consideration,* the* contestation* rate* is* indeed* slightly* lower* if* the* proposing*Commissioner*shares*partisan*ties*with*the*voting*government*and*if*countries*do*not*match*(12.3%*compared* to*13%*contestation).* If* the*country* is*already*matching,* then* a* party*match* does* not* further* increase* cohesion.* Instead,* the*contestation*rate*is*lowest*in*cases*where*countries*match,*while*parties*do*not*(8.9*per*cent).**Second,*the*effect*of*the*narrower*operationalization*–*of*whether*the*proposing*Commissioner* comes* from* the* same* party* family* as* the* responsible* national*minister*–* is* considered* in*Table*2b.*Here,* the*difference* the*partisan*variable*makes* is*slightly* larger* than*before.* If*parties*match*11.5*per*cent*of* the*votes*cast* are* contesting* votes* whereas* it* is* 12.9* per* cent* if* parties* do* not* match.*
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Again,*the*partisan*ties*lower*the*contestation*rate*if*countries*do*not*match*and*the* difference* is* bigger* than* for* the* governmental* operationalization.* Also* if*countries* match,* the* trend* is* in* the* same* direction* and* stronger* than* before.*Only* 6.4* per* cent* of* the* ministers* who* do* not* share* partisan* ties* with* their*proposing*Commissioners* contested* the*proposal,*while*10.9*per* cent*of* those*sharing*partisan*ties*contested*it.*However,*it*seems*that*these*contestations*are*the*same*as*with*the*previous*operationalization*and*that*for*only*39*of*the*nonCcontesting* votes* does* the* classification* change* due* to* the* stricter*operationalization,* thereby* increasing* the* percentage* difference.* There* is* thus*no* clear* support* for* the* second* hypothesis* that* partisan* ties* decrease*contestation.**Generally,* shared* national* ties* decrease* the* level* of* contestation,* lending*support*to*hypothesis*one.*Partisan*ties*have*a*minor*effect*on*contestation*and*therefore* hypothesis* two* is* not* supported.*When* combining* both* variables* it*seems* that*nationality* takes*precedence*over*partisanship* as*partisan* ties* add*little* if* national* ties* are* also* present.* However,* if* national* ties* are* not* shared,*partisan* ties* decrease* the* contestation* rate* and* even*more* so*when* using* the*‘stricter’*operationalization.*Whether*these*trends*hold*when*controlling*for*the*factors*found*to*be*important*in*previous*studies*of*Council*voting*is*now*tested.*As* the* dependent* variable* is* dichotomous* and* the* variables* pertain* to*characteristics* of* the* voting* member* state* as* well* as* the* proposal* voted* on,*crossCclassified*logit*regression*models*are*estimates*(see*Tables*3a*and*3b)2.*Also*in*these*models,*shared*national*and*partisan*ties*are*estimated*to*decrease*the*likelihood*of*contestation.*The*effect*of*a*matching*nationality*is*significant*at*the*0.1*level*in*models*1*and*2.*Based*on*model*2,*the*first*difference*in*expected*values* is* C2.8* [C5.2,* C0.2]* per* cent*when* changing* the* ‘Country*Match’* variable*from*0*to*1*while*holding*the*remaining*variables*at*their*mean*values3.*That*is,*national*ties*between*the*proposing*Commissioner*and*the*voting*member*state*reduce*the*likelihood*of*contestation*–*albeit*by*only*a*small*margin.*Still,*given*********************************************************2*All*models*are*estimated*using*Zelig’s*‘logit.mixed’*model,*which*uses*the*Laplace*approximation*to*fit*the*models*(Bailey*and*Alimadhi,*2007).*3*The*95%*Cconfidence*interval*of*the*estimate*is*presented*in*squared*brackets.**
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the*low*overall*possibility*of*contestation,*this*effect*is*nonCnegligible.*Generally,*the*models*support*Hypothesis*1*that*fewer*contestations*should*be*observable*when*a*member*state*is*voting*on*a*proposal*tables*by*its*‘own’*Commissioner.**The* coefficients* of* the* ‘party* match* government’* variable* are* consistently*statistically* insignificant.* In* model* 9,* the* partisan* ties* with* the* responsible*minister* significantly* decrease* the* likelihood* of* contestation.* However,* this*effect*does*not*hold*when*adding*the*‘country*match’*variable*(model*10).*There*is*thus*no*support*for*the*second*hypothesis.**Turning* to* the* control* variables* at* the* member* state* level,* holding* the*presidency*at*the*time*of*voting*reduces*the*likelihood*of*contestation*by*about*four*percentage*points,*which*is*in*line*with*previous*findings.*Being*one*of*the*member*states*that*joined*the*Union*in*2004*or*one*of*the*big*member*states*has*no*significant*effect*on*the*state’s*likelihood*of*contestation.**Concerning*the*effects*of*the*proposal*level*variables,*for*decisions*taken*under*the* coCdecision* procedure* contesting* votes* are* less* likely* than* for* decisions*taken*under*one*of*the*other*procedures.*Generally,*the*included*proposalClevel*variables*predict*contestation*so*well*that*there*is*no*variance*left*at*this*level.***
Council!voting!on!postMSanter!proposals!Having*found*support*for*the*first*but*none*for*the*second*hypothesis*in*the*full*dataset,* I* reCran* the* analyses* on* votes* on* proposals* tables* by*members* of* the*Prodi*and*first*Barroso*Commissions.*As*described*above,*the*selection*process*for* new* Commissions* has* been* tightened* after* the* resignation* of* the* Santer*Commission,* which* is* expected* to* have* strengthened* the* effect* that*Commissioner*characteristics*bring*to*the*legislative*process.*The*2040*votes*on*proposals*during*the*Santer*Commission*plus*45*votes*on*three*earlier*proposals*are*thus*excluded*now,*leaving*6940*votes*in*the*analysis.*Again,* the* analysis* start* with* a* crossCtabulation,* the* results* of* which* are*presented* in* Table* 4.* Also* in* this* subset* Hypothesis* 1* is* supported.* If* the*
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proposing*Commissioner*comes*from*the*voting*member*state,*the*frequency*of*contestation*drops*from*13.1*to*9.5*per*cent.*Corresponding*to*the*trend*in*the*full*dataset,* if* the*Commissioner*does*not*come* from*the*voting*member*state,*partisan* ties* decrease* the* frequency* of* contestation* (regardless* of* the*operationalization).* However,* if* the* proposing* Commissioner* comes* from* the*voting* member* state,* members* of* the* Commissioner’s* party* more* frequently*contest*that*Commissioner’s*proposals*than*members*of*other*parties.**The*results*of*the*logit*models*for*the*subset*can*be*found*in*Tables*5a*and*5b.*Again,* national* ties* decrease* the* likelihood* of* contestation.* In* this* subset,* the*relation*between*the*country*match*and*the*partisan*variables*is*more*nuanced.*The*effect*of* the*governmental*variable* is* lower*as* soon*as* the*country* is*also*controlled*for,*whereas*when*using*the*ministerial*operationalization,*the*effect*of* the* partisan* variable* remains* significant* in* all* models.* If* the* responsible*minister*comes*from*the*same*party*family*as*the*proposing*Commissioner,*the*likelihood* of* contestation* decreases* by* 2.2* [0.6,* 3.7]* per* cent* based* on*model*10b.* In*this*subset,*partisan*ties* indeed*decrease*the* likelihood*of*contestation,*lending*support*to*the*second*–*and*therefore*also*the*third*–*hypotheses.*It*thus*seems* that* the*member* states*were* successful* in* tightening* their* control* over*their*agents.**At*a*more*general*level,*member*states*appear*to*be*quite*successful*in*choosing*Commissioners*who*stay*loyal*to*their*home*countries*after*their*appointment.*It*appears* that* the* selection* process* largely* induces* the* agents* to* perform*according* to* their* principals’* expectations.* Furthermore,* whether* or* not*deliberately*designed*to*tighten*the*Commission’s*leash,*the*changes*made*to*the*nomination* rules* after* the* resignation*of* the* Santer*Commission* seem* to*have*strengthened* the*member* states’* control.* In* the* postCSanter* era* there*was* an*especially* strong*bond*between*Commissioners* and*national*ministers* coming*from*the*same*party*family.**Overall,* shared* ties* between* the* proposing* Commissioner* and* the* voting*member*state*have*the*tendency*to*further*reduce*the*likelihood*of*contestation.*Accordingly,* the* allocation*of* Commissioner*portfolios*has* implications* for* the*
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policyCmaking*process.*Member*states*are*thus*expected*to*not*only*care*about*which*portfolio*their*‘own’*Commissioner*gets*but*also*for*the*partisan*affiliation*of* the* Commissioners* in* charge* of* other* portfolios* important* to* them.* These*partisan*control*mechanisms*can*be*expected*to*become*more*prominent*as*the*number*of*Commissioners*eventually*drops*below*the*number*of*member*states,*as*mandated*by*the*Treaty*of*Nice.**
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Variable Operationalization Source Min Mean Max 
Dependent Variable  
 
    
Contestation 
Whether the voting member state voted against the 
proposal/ abstained from voting (1) or not (0) 
Mattila and Lane (2001); Hayes-Renshaw et al. 
(2006); Hosli et al. (2011) 
 0 [0]  0.12 [0.13] 1 [1] 
Independent Variables  
 
    
Vote Level       
Country Match 
Whether the proposing Commissioner comes from the 
voting member state or not (1) or not (0) 
Proposing Commissioner identified via PreLex (i.e. 
the ‘responsible’ Commissioner in the ‘adoption by 
commission’ stage); Biographical information on the 
Commissioners from Wonka; Information on 
government composition obtained from various 
issues of the EJPR Political Data Yearbook 
 0 [0]  0.06 [0.05] 1 [1] 
Party Match 
Whether the party of the proposing Commissioner and at 
least one of the parties in government in the voting 
member state belong to the same European Party Group 
(1) or not (0) 
 0 [0]  0.46 [0.47] 1 [1] 
Party Match Minister 
Whether the party of the proposing Commissioner and the 
party of the responsible minister in the voting member 
state belong to the same European Party Group (1) or not 
(0) 
 0 [0]  0.28 [0.28] 1 [1] 
Member State Level      
Presidency  Whether the member state held the Council presidency at 
the time of voting (1) or not (0) 
  0 [0]  0.06 [0.05] 1 [1] 
New Member State 
Whether the member states joined the EU in 2004 (1) or 
not (0)   0 [0]  0.17 [0.23] 1 [1] 
Operating Budgetary 
Balance 
A member state’s operating budgetary balance in the year 
of voting in billion euros 







Proposal Level      
Co-Decision Whether the proposal is passed under the co-decision procedure (1) or not (0) PreLex  0 [0]  0.44 [0.43] 1 [1] 
 
TABLE 1 – Summary Statistics: Council Voting 1998-2006 (N=9025) 





No Yes  
Party Match Government Party Match Government  
 
No Yes Total No Yes Total Total 
Contestation 
No 
4148 3301 7449 92 357 449 7898 
(87.0%) (87.7%) (87.3%) (91.1%) (90.2%) (90.3%) (87.5%) 
Yes 
618 461 1079 9 39 48 1127 
(13.0%) (12.3%) (12.7%) (8.9%) (9.8%) (9.7%) (12.5%) 
 Total 4766 3762 8528 101 396 497 9025  (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
 
 
        
(b) Country Match  
 
No Yes  
Party Match Minister Party Match Minister 
 
 
No Yes Total No Yes Total Total 
Contestation 
No 
5561 1888 7449 131 318 449 7898 
(87.0%) (88.4%) (87.3%) (93.6%) (89.1%) (90.3%) (87.5%) 
Yes 
832 247 1079 9 39 48 1127 
(13.0%) (11.6%) (12.7%) (6.4%) (10.9%) (9.7%) (12.5%) 
 Total 6393 2135 8528 140 357 497 9025  (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
 
TABLE 2 – Contestation by Commissioner Characteristics (1998-2006) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Mattila and Lane 2001, Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006, Hosli et al. 2011.  
 
 Empty Model Country Match Party Match 
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     + Control 
Variables 
 + Country Match + Control 
Variables 
Full Model 
Vote Level                
Country Match   -0.340 (0.160) * -0.342 (0.160) *   -0.310 (0.162)    -0.309 (0.163)  
Party Match       -0.097 (0.068)  -0.072 (0.069)  -0.104 (0.068) -0.078 (0.069) 
Member State Level              
Presidency      -0.612 (0.174) ***     -0.614 (0.174) *** -0.612 (0.174) *** 
New Member State     -0.327 (0.198)      -0.316 (0.198) -0.329 (0.198) 
Operating Budgetary Balance     -0.024 (0.028)     -0.024 (0.028) -0.024 (0.028) 
Proposal Level               
Co-Decision     -0.217 (0.075) **     -0.220 (0.075) ** -0.219 (0.075) ** 
Constant (Fixed Effects) -2.135 (0.101) *** -2.122 (0.102) *** -1.888 (0.121) *** -2.093 (0.105) *** -2.091 (0.106) *** -1.859 (0.124) *** -1.854 (0.124) *** 
Variance (Proposals) 0.157 (0.396) 0.157 (0.397) 0.146 (0.382) 0.158 (0.397) 0.158 (0.397) 0.146 (0.382) 0.146 (0.382) 
Variance (Member States) 0.207 (0.455) 0.208 (0.457) 0.176 (0.420) 0.207 (0.455) 0.209 (0.457) 0.176 (0.419) 0.176 (0.419) 
AIC 6645 6642 6625 6645 6643 6628 6626 
Log Likelihood -3320 -3317 -3304 -3318 -3317 -3306 -3304 
 
TABLE 3a  - Mixed Effects Logit Models (Random Intercepts) of Council Voting on Contested Proposals voted upon between 1998 and 2006 
Results for 9025 votes taken on 497 proposals by 25 member states  
Sources: Own analysis based on data from Mattila and Lane 2001, Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006, Hosli et al. 2011. 
Notes: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1, standard errors (standard deviations for variances) are given in parentheses 
  
 Party Match Minister 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  + Country Match + Control 
Variables 
Full Model 
Vote Level          
Country Match   -0.290 (0.164)    -0.285 (0.165)  
Party Match Minister -0.137 (0.076)  -0.103 (0.078)  -0.151 (0.076) * -0.117 (0.079) 
Member State Level        
Presidency      -0.614 (0.174) *** -0.613 (0.174) *** 
New Member State     -0.329 (0.198) -0.338 (0.198) 
Operating Budgetary Balance     -0.023 (0.028) -0.023 (0.028) 
Proposal Level         
Co-Decision     -0.224 (0.075) ** -0.222 (0.075) ** 
Constant (Fixed Effects) -2.102 (0.103) *** -2.099 (0.103) *** -1.861 (0.123) *** -1.856 (0.122) *** 
Variance (Proposals) 0.157 (0.396) 0.158 (0.397) 0.145 (0.381) 0.139 (0.372) 
Variance (Member States) 0.208 (0.456) 0.209 (0.457) 0.176 (0.420) 0.192 (0.438) 
AIC 6644 6642 6626 6625 
Log Likelihood -3318 -3316 -3305 -3303 
 
TABLE  3b - Mixed Effects Logit Models (Random Intercepts) of Council Voting on Contested Proposals voted upon between 1998 and 2006 
Results for 9025 votes taken on 497 proposals by 25 member states  
Sources: Own analysis based on data from Mattila and Lane 2001, Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006, Hosli et al. 2011. 





No Yes  
Party Match Government Party Match Government  
 
No Yes Total No Yes Total Total 
Contestation 
No 
3129 2594 5723 43 281 324 6047 
(86.2%) (87.8%) (86.9%) (93.5%) (90.1%) (90.5%) (87.1%) 
Yes 
499 369 859 3 31 34 893 
(13.8%) (12.2%) (13.1%) (6.5%) (9.9%) (9.5%) (12.9%) 
 Total 3628 2954 6582 46 312 358 6940  (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
 
 
        
(b) Country Match  
 
No Yes  
Party Match Minister Party Match Minister 
 
 
No Yes Total No Yes Total Total 
Contestation 
No 
4229 1494 5723 79 245 324 6047 
(86.3%) (88.9%) (86.9%) (96.3%) (88.8%) (90.5%) (87.1%) 
Yes 
672 187 859 3 31 34 893 
(13.7%) (11.1%) (13.1%) (3.7%) (11.2%) (9.5%) (12.9%) 
 Total 4901 1681 6582 82 276 358 6940  (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
 
TABLE 4 – Contestation by Commissioner Characteristics (post-Santer) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Mattila and Lane 2001, Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006, Hosli et al. 2011.! !
!
 Empty Model Country Match Party Match 
 (0b) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) 
     + Control 
Variables 
 + Country Match + Control 
Variables 
Full Model 
Vote Level                
Country Match   -0.474 (0.192) * -0.468 (0.192) *   -0.397 (0.196) *   -0.386 (0.196) * 
Party Match       -0.187 (0.077) * -0.149 (0.079)  -0.194 (0.077) * -0.157 (0.079) * 
Member State Level              
Presidency      -0.536 (0.200) **     -0.548 (0.200) ** -0.538 (0.200) ** 
New Member State     -0.379 (0.211)      -0.367 (0.210) -0.382 (0.211) 
Operating Budgetary Balance     -0.031 (0.033)     -0.034 (0.032) -0.032 (0.033) 
Proposal Level               
Co-Decision     -0.313 (0.090) ***     -0.316 (0.090) *** -0.316 (0.090) *** 
Constant (Fixed Effects) -2.131 (0.109) *** -2.114 (0.110) *** -1.819 (0.133) *** -2.049 (0.115) *** -2.051 (0.115) *** -1.753 (0.136) *** -1.750 (0.137) *** 
Variance (Proposals) 0.225 (0.474) 0.227 (0.476) 0.202 (0.449) 0.228 (0.478) 0.229 (0.479) 0.203 (0.451) 0.204 (0.452) 
Variance (Member States) 0.237 (0.487) 0.242 (0.492) 0.204 (0.452) 0.239 (0.489) 0.242 (0.492) 0.201 (0.449) 0.203 (0.450) 
AIC 5176 5172 5155 5172 5170   5156 5154 
Log Likelihood -2585 -2582 -2570 -2582 -2580 -2570 -2568 
 
TABLE 5a - Mixed Effects Logit Models (Random Intercepts) of Council Voting on Contested Proposals made by members of the Prodi and Barroso Commissions 
Results for 6940 votes taken on 358 proposals by 25 member states  
Sources: Own analysis based on data from Mattila and Lane 2001, Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006, Hosli et al. 2011. 
Notes: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1, standard errors (standard deviations for variances) are given in parentheses 
  
 Party Match Minister 
 (7b) (8b) (9b) (10b) 
  + Country Match + Control 
Variables 
Full Model 
Vote Level          
Country Match   -0.351 (0.198)    -0.336 (0.198)  
Party Match Minister -0.268 (0.088) ** -0.223 (0.091) * -0.279 (0.088) ** -0.235 (0.091) ** 
Member State Level        
Presidency      -0.543 (0.200) ** -0.535 (0.200) ** 
New Member State     -0.392 (0.211) -0.402 (0.212)  
Operating Budgetary Balance     -0.031 (0.033) -0.030 (0.033) 
Proposal Level         
Co-Decision     -0.321 (0.090) *** -0.320 (0.090) *** 
Constant (Fixed Effects) -2.067 (0.112) *** -2.064 (0.113) *** -1.759 (0.135) *** -1.755 (0.135) *** 
Variance (Proposals) 0.227 (0.477) 0.228 (0.478) 0.201 (0.449) 0.202 (0.450) 
Variance (Member States) 0.242 (0.491) 0.244 (0.494) 0.203 (0.451) 0.204 (0.452) 
AIC 5169 5168 5152 5151 
Log Likelihood -2580 -2579 -2568 -2567 
 
TABLE 5b - Mixed Effects Logit Models (Random Intercepts) of Council Voting on Contested Proposals made by members of the Prodi and Barroso Commissions  
Results for 6940 votes taken on 358 proposals by 25 member states  
Sources: Own analysis based on data from Mattila and Lane 2001, Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006, Hosli et al. 2011. 
Notes: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1, standard errors (standard deviations for variances) are given in parentheses ! !
